Cybersecurity and Voting Machines

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Gateway Pundit has an article, that is quite interesting for those interested in Cyber Security. Unfortunately, the article is not very well written, but thankfully, the videos contain much better description of what the issue is with these voting machines in question.

In a nutshell

A cyber security expert tested the ‘software image’ used on Voting Machines. He used his notebook to install the image – the Software is based on Microsoft Windows, uses Microsoft SQL Server (SQLS) and a visual database administration software called Microsoft SQL Management Server (SMSS).

On that notebook, the cyber security expert was able to start SMSS log in to the SQLS and change the vote counts using a few mouse clicks.
Later, the cyber security expert showed, how to change vote counts with an SQL Script on an USB stick.

What this means

First, there was software (SMSS) found on the image used for vote counting machines that shouldn’t be on a certfied vote counting machine. This invalidates the certification of the machine and make its use in election improper.

Should this invalidate the vote count? In my view yes.

It’s all about trust in the election process, and using vote counting machines that are not certified does not improve trust in the election process. In fact, why have a certification at all if uncertified machines can also be used without consequences.

Second, this SMSS is allowing full administrative access to the SQLS database containing the vote counts.

Should this invalidate the vote count? In my view, yes.

Experience shows, that most security issues with databases come from the use of credential (username/passwords) that are either easy to crack and/or have to many rights (i.e. can write to the database, when they should only be able to read). If such credentials are stored on the images, then all you need to do is to log on to the voting machine and have full administrative access. If that’s really how the voting machine works, than this is a big security design flaw.

Third, the SQLS database can also be accessed in full administrator mode with a SQL script that is stored on a USB stick. Once the USB is plugged in that script runs on a command line, i.e. thus not require SMSS, and allows the vote count to be changed.

Should this invalidate the vote count? In my view, yes. For the same reason as in ‘Second’.

Fourth, the design of the voting machine seems to be that, once logged in to the Windows machine, the account used to log in to Windows machine is also used to access SQLS in full administrative mode. If that is really true, and it’s hard to believe it is, this is a big security design flaw. Such a setup is usually only used in development environments, but should never be used in production.

Should this invalidate the vote count? In my view yes.

If the voting machine is really set-up like this, it is open to all kinds of abuse and tampering. I could not imagine this to be certifiable in any way.

Fifth, the cyber security calls both the SMSS and the USB method ‘a backdoor’, which is completly accurate in these circumstances. Access to the database containing the votes should only be possible via the management software provided by the vendor, and not by any third party means.

Should this invalidate the vote count? In my view, yes.

If the voting machine is really set-up like this, it is open to all kinds of abuse and tampering. I could not imagine this to be certifiable in any way.

Conclusion

A word of caution: I am working with the description found in the above mentioned videos from the Gateway Pundit article. Assuming they contain correct observations, I draw my conclusions here.
I have not tested that myself.
I am also assuming that in elections these ‘software images’ will be running on specialised hardware that are not quite the same as of the shelf notebooks. It remains to be demonstrated that these observations made are valid for such voting machines as well.

With these in mind, as an cyber security professional myself, I conclude that, given the observations made above are correct and can be reproduced on actual real-life voting machines, there is no way these voting machines should or even could be certified for real elections. They should als lose their certification until and must be re-certified once the issues brought to light are fixed.

Given what I’ve learned from this – not even taking into account other articles on election issues in US elections – I can definitely say, that I can have no confidence in the integrity of the election process in places where these voting machines were used.